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TOWARD  A THEORY  OF DISCOUNTED  REPEATED  GAMES 
WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING 
BY  DILIP  ABREU,  DAVID  PEARCE,  AND ENNIO  STACCHETTI1 
This  paper  investigates  pure  strategy sequential  equilibria of  repeated  games  with 
imperfect monitoring. The approach emphasizes the equilibrium value set and the static 
optimization  problems  embedded  in  extremal  equilibria. A  succession  of  propositions, 
central  among which  is  "self-generation,"  allow properties  of  constrained  efficient  su- 
pergame equilibria to be deduced from the solutions of the static problems. We show that 
the  latter  include  solutions  having  a  "bang-bang" property; this  affords  a  significant 
simplification of the  equilibria that need  be  considered.  These  results apply to  a broad 
class  of  asymmetric  games,  thereby  generalizing  our  earlier  work  on  optimal  cartel 
equilibria. The  bang-bang theorem  is  strengthened  to  a necessity  result: under certain 
conditions,  efficient sequential  equilibria have the property that after every history, the 
value  to players of  the  remainder of  the  equilibrium must be  an extreme  point  of  the 
equilibrium value set. General implications of the self-generation and bang-bang proposi- 
tions  include  a  proof  of  the  monotonicity  of  the  equilibrium average value  set  in  the 
discount factor, and an iterative procedure for computing the value set. 
KEYWORDS:  Asymmetric  repeated  games,  extremal  equilibria, self-generation,  bang- 
bang reward functions, algorithm. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A RECENT PAPER of ours (Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti  (1986), hereafter  APS) 
demonstrates  the existence  of equilibria  of the Green-Porter  model (Green and 
Porter  (1984),  Porter  (1983))  that are optimal  in terms  of the degree of implicit 
collusion they sustain, and yet  have an unexpectedly simple intertemporal 
structure.  Here we exploit  the same analytic  approach  to develop a theory  for a 
broad class of asymmetric  discounted  repeated games with imperfect  monitor- 
ing. The results  characterize  efficient  sequential  equilibria,  facilitate  their com- 
putation,  and establish  a strong  relationship  between the equilibrium  value set 
and the discount  factor. More generally,  they demonstrate  the advantages  of a 
perspective  which  views these repeated  games in terms  of a particular  intertem- 
poral decomposition. 
Our analysis  is in the spirit  of dynamic  programming,  whose impact  on game 
theory  has, of course,  been substantial  (see, for example,  Shapley  (1953),  Abreu 
(1988), and Radner,  Myerson,  and Maskin  (1986)).  It proceeds  via a succession 
of propositions,  central  among  which is "self-generation"  (see Section 3), which 
reduce the study  of the equilibria  in question  to the solution  of a class of static 
1 It is a pleasure to acknowledge useful conversations with Ed Green and Herb Scarf. We would 
particularly like  to  thank  Andreu  Mas-Colell,  Paul  Milgrom,  and  Hans  Weinberger  for  their 
invaluable assistance at various stages of the paper's development. Russell Lyons was extraordinarily 
generous with his time and technical expertise; the discussion of measurability in the Appendix owes 
much to  his input. We  are grateful to  a co-editor  and the  anonymous referees  for their helpful 
comments. This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation. 
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problems.  The remainder  of this section is devoted to an informal  exposition  of 
our results. This overview  abstracts  from the measure-theoretic  issues that are 
dealt with in the analysis. 
The supergames  studied here involve  the indefinite  repetition  of a simultane- 
ous, N-person  stage game:  see Section  2 for formal  definitions.  In each period t, 
players  independently  select actions from their respective  pure strategy  sets in 
the stage game. The vector of strategies selected determines the probability 
distribution  of  a  payoff-relevant  random variable P,  whose realization2  is 
publicly  observed  at the end of period t. At no time does any player i observe 
the actions chosen earlier by other players. Nor can i  infer this information 
from the signal realizations:  the  support of  P  is independent of the action 
profile.  A player's  expected payoff at the end of t depends on his own action 
directly,  and on the profile  of actions  insofar  as the latter affects  the distribution 
of the signal.  Payoffs  are discounted  (to the beginning  of period 1) according  to 
the common  discount  factor a E (0, 1). 
We study sequential equilibria  (adapted from Kreps and Wilson (1982)) in 
pure strategies  (hereafter  abbreviated  as S.E.). With each S.E. of the supergame 
is associated  a profile  of discounted  payoffs,  one for each player;  the set of S.E. 
payoff  vectors  is denoted V. Without  loss of generality  (as we show in Section 3), 
we restrict attention to S.E.'s in which each player makes his actions depend 
only upon past signal realizations  (not on his own previous  actions).  After any 
first period history,  an S.E. induces a "continuation  profile"  on the remaining 
subtree. Because the first period signal realization is publicly observed, this 
profile is common  knowledge,  and is itself a sequential  equilibrium.  The value 
of the continuation  profile  is therefore  always  in V. 
In order to obtain some powerful  characterizations  of the equilibrium  value 
set, it is useful to regard  an S.E. as specifying  a profile  of actions q for players 
in the first period, and a continuation  reward  function that "promises"  some 
expected payoff u(p) e V for the remainder  of the game (the value of the 
"continuation  equilibrium"),  depending  on the value p of the first  period  signal. 
The value of the S.E. can also be viewed as being the value of the pair (q, u). 
Equilibrium  requires that certain incentive constraints  be satisfied: for each 
player  i, the choice qi must maximize  the sum of his first  period payoff  and the 
expected value of the reward  function. (Note that the choice of action affects 
the distribution  of the signal and hence the expectation of the continuation 
value.) Think now of an arbitrary  pair (q, u), with q an action profile of the 
stage game, and u a measurable  function  from the signal  space into RN,  but not 
necessarily  associated  with any equilibrium.  We say that (q, u) is admissible  with 
respect  to V if it satisfies  the incentive  constraints  explained  above, and if for all 
p, u(p) E V. Let B(V) CRN  be the set of all values of pairs admissible  with 
respect to V. For any S.E., it is clear that the associated pair (the period 1 
action  profile  and continuation  reward  function)  is admissible  with respect  to V, 
2We  follow  the  standard  practice  of  using  upper  and  lower  cases,  respectively,  to  distinguish 
between  a  random  variable  and  a  particular  realization. DISCOUNTED  REPEATED  GAMES  1043 
therefore V c B(V). Conversely,  from any pair (q, u) admissible  with respect to 
V, construct an S.E.  as follows: the  first period  action profile specified by the 
S.E. is q, and the continuation equilibrium induced after any first period signal 
p  is some S.E. o-(p) having value u(p)  (by the definition of  V, u(p)  E V implies 
the  existence  of  an S.E.  o-(p)  with value  u(p)).  It is straightforward to check 
that the profile constructed is indeed an S.E., therefore B(V)  c  V. We conclude 
that  V= B(V),  which is the  content  of Theorem  2 of  Section  3. This result is 
referred  to  as  "factorization"  because  it  follows  from  the  factorization  or 
decomposition  (in  dynamic programming fashion)  of  an  equilibrium  into  an 
admissible  pair. 
Although  factorization proves to have a number of applications, much more 
can be said about  V  by studying admissible pairs in a broader context. For an 
arbitrary  set W c RN, a pair (q, u) is admissible with respect  to W if it satisfies the 
relevant incentive  constraints as above,  and for all signal values  p, u(p)  E W. 
The  set  of  all values  of  pairs admissible with  respect  to  W  is  called  B(W). 
Notice  that  the  elements  of  B(W)  are  "generated" by reward functions  that 
draw values from W, just as elements of  V are generated by continuation 
reward  functions  that draw  values  from V itself. Any set W such that W  c B(W) 
is called self-generating  (as all elements of  W can be generated using rewards 
from W). Theorem  1 of Section 3 establishes  that if W is a bounded,  self-gener- 
ating set, then B(W) c V. This result, which implies that all the values in any 
bounded  self-generating  set are sequential  equilibrium  values, is called self-gen- 
eration.  An informal  treatment  of the argument  is deferred  until Section 3. 
Factorization  and self-generation  generalize  theorems  established  in APS for 
symmetric  equilibria  of symmetric  games. Some of their theoretical  applications 
are illustrated  in what follows; for instance, self-generation  permits a general 
proof that the value set, expressed  in average  terms,  is increasing  in the discount 
factor (see Section 6). But self-generation  is also of practical  use in studying 
specific  examples.  It is sometimes  relatively  simple to choose a set of points in 
RN  and show that they constitute  a self-generating  set for the supergame  under 
investigation.  Then one has established  that each of the points is the payoff  of 
some sequential  equilibrium  of the infinite  horizon  game. 
Theorem 3  asserts that for any pair (q,  )  admissible with respect to  a 
compact  set W, there exists u such that (q, u) has the same value as the original 
pair, and is admissible  with respect to ext W (the extreme  points of the convex 
hull of  W). As  Section 4 explains, this allows a major simplification  of su- 
pergame equilibria:  without loss of generality, one can restrict attention to 
S.E.'s  whose continuation  values, after any  history,  are extreme  points  of V. If V 
is a rectangle, for example, after the first period at most four continuation 
values and four associated  action profiles  arise in equilibrium.  A corresponding 
"bang-bang"  result for symmetric  equilibria  is found in APS. If one generalized 
the argument  of APS to asymmetric  equilibria,  the result would be weaker. 
Namely,  continuation  equilibria  may be taken to be boundary  points of  V, but 
not necessarily  extreme points of  V. The distinction  is at times critical:  in the 
2-person  rectangular  example  just mentioned, V has a continuum  of boundary 1044  DILIP  ABREU,  DAVID  PEARCE,  AND  ENNIO  STACCHETTI 
points,  but  only  four  extreme  points.  Our  proof  of  the  stronger  result  is  a 
straightforward application of a technical theorem of Aumann (1965). 
The result that it is sufficient to consider reward functions of the bang-bang 
form is open to objections concerning the appropriateness of the restriction. If 
the "natural" solution were a smooth function, which could be replaced by one 
with the bang-bang property at the cost of creating a complex pattern of rapid 
alternations  among  extremal values,  one  kind  of  simplicity would  be  traded 
against another. Reassurance  is provided by a much stronger characterization, 
new to this paper, in Section 7. Under certain conditions, the reward functions 
faced  by  players  in  Pareto-efficient  equilibria  must  be  bang-bang: efficiency 
demands that nonextremal points of the payoff set are never used. 
The dynamic programming technique of value iteration (Howard (1960)) has 
an analogue in repeated games which is discussed in Section 5. It is an iterative 
procedure for computing the set of equilibrium values. The novelty here is the 
presence  of  sequential  incentive  constraints and the  fact that the  map that is 
iterated is set-valued. Apart from its importance for the numerical computation 
of equilibria of specific supergames, the algorithm is an alternative characteriza- 
tion of the equilibrium value set,  and as such will have a variety of theoretical 
applications. Suppose that for any WCRN,  one  is able to compute  B(W)  (this 
may  be  a  substantial  task).  The  algorithm  works  as  follows.  Begin  with  a 
compact set W0 sufficiently large that it is known a priori to satisfy V c B(WO)  c 
W0.  Apply the operator B  repeatedly to obtain the decreasing sequence  of sets 
{Wnln}==0,  where for each  n,  Wn+1  = B(Wn). Theorem 5 shows that this sequence 
converges to the supergame value set V. The relationship to some earlier results 
by Fudenberg  and  Levine  (1983)  linking infinite  and  finite  horizon  games  is 
explained briefly in Section 5. 
The ways in which this paper furthers the research reported in APS may be 
summarized as follows. First, it relaxes the restriction of symmetry, showing the 
theory capable of embracing both asymmetric equilibria of symmetric games and 
arbitrary  asymmetric games. Secondly, the sufficiency of using bang-bang reward 
functions  in efficiently collusive  equilibria is strengthened  to  a  necessity theo- 
rem.  Finally,  we  provide  an  algorithm  useful  in  computing  the  sequential 
equilibrium value set. 
Except for Section  6, this paper takes the discount factor  a  to be fixed, and 
studies the value set  and the nature of constrained efficient equilibria for that 
degree  of  patience.  In  this  way  it  complements  the  literature  initiated  by 
Radner (1985) and Radner, Myerson, and Maskin (1986)3 which focuses on the 
limiting behavior of the value set of supergames with imperfect monitoring as 8 
approaches  1. A  dynamic programming approach again proves useful  for folk 
theorems with discounting: this is powerfully demonstrated  by Fudenberg  and 
Maskin  (1986)  and  Fudenberg,  Levine,  and  Maskin  (1988).  There  is  also  a 
growing body of work on the related topic of repeated  agency theory: see,  for 
3This  line of work is ultimately inspired by the early papers on folk theorems without discount- 
ing, especially Aumann and Shapley (1976), Rubinstein (1979a), and Rubinstein (1979b). DISCOUNTED  REPEATED  GAMES  1045 
example, Fudenberg,  Holmstr6m,  and Milgrom  (1988), Rogerson (1985), and 
Spear and Srivastava  (1987). 
2.  THE  MODEL 
The model outlined below features unobservable  actions, stochastic out- 
comes, and a  publicly observable random variable correlated with players' 
private  choices. It lends itself naturally  to the study of a number  of economic 
questions.  Important  examples  are oligopoly  (Green and Porter (1984), Porter 
(1983))  and partnership  problems  (Radner  (1986)) of various  kinds. 
The Stage Game 
The N-person  stage game is denoted G. Each player  i has a finite strategy  set 
Si and a payoff function Hi  S -3  R, where S:=  S, x  ...  X SN. For q E S, Hi(q) 
is an expected value. Payoffs actually received  7-i(p,  qi),  are stochastic and 
depend on realizations  of a random  variable P which takes values in 12  c R . 
The distribution  of P  is parameterized  by the vector of actions q E S,  and is 
denoted  '(I;  q).  Realized  payoffs  7i  depend  on  q-i.=  (q  ,  . *  qi- 1,  qi+ 
. ..  ,qN) only through  the effect of the latter on the distribution  of P.  Finally, 
Hn(q) = JQ  vi(p,  qi) I!(dp; q). 
The Repeated Game 
We denote by G'(8)  the infinitely  repeated game with component  game G 
and discount factor 8 E (0, 1). Players can observe (and therefore condition 
upon) only their own past actions and past realizations  of the random  variable 
P.  Hence, a  strategy (i  for player i  in  G'(8)  is  a  sequence of  Lebesgue 
measurable  functions {oi((t)}=  1, where (i(1) e Si, and for t >  1,  oi(t):  Qt-  1  x 
Si-1  S..  Let  pt =  (p(l)  ...  , p(t))  and  qt =  (q(l),..  .,  q(t))  denote  t-period 
signal and action histories, respectively.  As  is  standard ar:pt,qt  denotes the 
strategy profile induced by o- after the  t-period history (pt,  qt).  In each period, 
p is drawn  independently  according  to the distribution  W(; q). Associated  with 
any strategy  profile o- of  G'(8)  is a stochastic stream of payoff vectors. The 
expected  present  discounted value  of  this  stream  is  denoted  v(r)  = 
(v1(V ), .. .,  vN(&r)). Note for later use that period t  payoffs  are received at the 
end of period t and discounted  to the beginning  of period 1. We assume that: 
(Al)  Si isfinite,  i =  ,...,N. 
(A2)  For each q c  S,  f(  ;  q)  is absolutely  continuous. Letg(  ; q)  be the 
corresponding  probability  density. 
(A3)  {p E  2I g(p;  q) > 0) is independent  of q E S. 
(A4)  1i (p, qi)  is continuous in p. 
(AS)  G has a Nash equilibrium  in pure strategies. 
Without  loss of generality  we take n to equal {p I  g(p; q) > 0). 1046  DILIP  ABREU,  DAVID  PEARCE,  AND  ENNIO  STACCHETrI 
Assumptions  (Al) and (A4) guarantee  that v(oS)  is well defined.  Theorems  3 
and 7 depend upon (A2). The solution concept used is the natural  generaliza- 
tion of sequential  equilibrium4  (see Kreps and Wilson (1982)) to the repeated 
games under consideration.  Hereafter, we  use  S.E. to  denote a  sequential 
equilibrium  in pure strategies,  and denote by V:= {v(o-)  I  o is an S.E.1  the set of 
S.E. payoffs.  Assumption  (A5) implies that V is nonempty;  the strategy  profile 
specifying  that in every  period independently  of the history  each player  uses his 
one-period Nash equilibrium action, is  an  S.E.  Further discussion of  the 
assumptions  is deferred  until Section 3. 
3.  FACTORIZATION  AND  SELF-GENERATION 
Consider  the maximization  problem  faced by a player  in the first  period of an 
equilibrium  a-. Recall that his choice of action qi has two consequences:  it 
affects  payoffs  in period 1, and also influences  the distribution  of the first-period 
signal p(l).  The player is in effect maximizing  the sum of current  payoffs  and 
the expectation  of the future reward  (a function  of p(l))  implicitly  "promised" 
by v. The reward  function  must be drawn  from V: an S.E. can offer only S.E. 
rewards.  Furthermore,  vi(1) must  yield at least as high a value of the sum as any 
other action available  to i. The same remarks  apply to player i's choice after 
any t-period  history. 
We proceed rather abstractly  by studying  structures  suggested  by the above 
observations  but no longer in the context of any particular  equilibrium. 
Let L(f2; RN) denote the set of equivalence  classes of essentially  bounded 
Lebesgue measurable  functions u from 12 into RN.  For any pair (q, u) E S x 
L"(f2;  RN),  E(q; u)  8= {H(q) + fI u(p)g(p;  q) dp}.  Clearly E(q; u)  is  continu- 
ous in u when L(f2; RN)  is endowed with the weak-* topology. For any set 
WcRN,  L{(f2; W)  will denote the set of functions u E LW(2;  RN)  such that 
u(p)e  W a.e. pEf  2. 
DEFINITION:  For any set  WC RN,  a  pair (q, u) E S x L (f2; RN)  is  called 
admissible with respect to W if 
(i)  u(p)  E W a.e. p e f2,  and 
(ii)  Ej(q;u)  >Ei(yi,q_;u)  for all yi E Si and i=  1,...,N. 
A profile q e S  is  supportable by W if there exists u e L0(n2;  RN)  such that 
(q, u) is admissible  with respect to W. 
4The  original definition applies to finite extensive games. In our usage, a sequential equilibrium 
will be a pure strategy profile o, such that for each player i, each t-period history q/ of actions by i, 
every supergame strategy 5ic  for i, almost every t-period signal history pt,  and the t-period history of 
action profiles qt i for players other than i induced by or and pt, 
Vi ( (lq',  p')  >  Vi  (i  C  a-10  I  q'-,,p')  - 
Note  that the  issue of  consistency does  not  arise, because  the  constant  support assumption (A3) 
makes  the  calculation  of  conditional  beliefs  at  any information  set  unambiguous.  See  also  the 
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These conditions mimic the two requirements  noted above on pairs of the 
form (recommended  action, reward  function)  arising  in an S.E. 
DEFINITION:  For each set WCRN,  B(W)  {= E(q; u)I(q, u) is admissible  w.r.t. 
w}. 
By the definition  of B(W), for each w e B(W) there exists a pair admissible 
with respect to W with value w. Hence (by the Axiom of Choice) there exist 
functions  Q:  B(W)  -*  S  and  U: B(W)  -*  L'(n,  W)  such  that  (Q(w), U(w))  is 
admissible with  respect  to  W and  E(Q(w); U(w)) = w  for all w c  B(W).  Fur- 
thermore, for any bounded Borel set  W, the domain of  Q  and U can be 
extended  to RN,  and the functions Q and (p, w) -3 U(wXp)  from 12  x RN  into 
RN can be taken to be universally  measurable.  The last remark  needs some 
justification;  we provide  a proof in Lemma  C of the Appendix.  The functions  Q 
and U are used extensively  below. The extension of  Q  and U to  RN, the 
requirement  that W is Borel, and various  measure-theoretic  qualifications  are 
unnecessary  if 12 is countable  (or finite). 
That admissibility  successfully  captures  the information  essential for studying 
V is evidenced in Theorems 1 (self-generation)  and 2 (factorization).  These 
combine  to say that V is the largest  bounded fixed point of the set-valued  map 
B. This is a powerful  result insofar as the definition  of B is quite simple and 
makes no reference to the complex strategic structure  of an infinite horizon 
game. 
The proofs of the theorems  below are very similar  to those presented  for the 
symmetric  case in APS. We have included them to provide a self-contained 
treatment. 
DEFINITION:  WCRN  is said to be self-generating  if WcB(W). 
THEOREM  1 (Self-Generation):  For any bounded Borel set  WCRN  if  W is 
self-generating,  then B(W)  c  V. 
Before giving a proof, we provide an intuitive  discussion  of self-generation; 
for simplicity,  qualifications  such as "almost everywhere"  are ignored. If  a 
bounded  set W is self-generating,  any  value in W is also in its image B(W). This 
permits  us to choose any element of B(W) and "transform"  it period-by-period 
into an S.E., say o-, having the same value. Begin by choosing a pair (q, u) 
admissible  with respect to W, with value w. Set ov(1)  = q. For any p E  2, we 
would like to ensure a continuation  value of u(p) in equilibrium.  As a first  step, 
select a pair (q', u') admissible  with respect to W, and having  value u(p) (this is 
possible because u(p) E WcB(W)).  Set the action profile in period 2 (given 
that p arose in the first period) equal to q', and for each p' E Q2  choose a new 
admissible  pair (q",  u") with value u'(p'). In this way strategies  for the first t 1048  DILIP  ABREU,  DAVID  PEARCE,  AND  ENNIO  STACCHETTI 
periods (for any t)  are generated. A  recursive step allows this process to 
determine  a complete  supergame  profile ov.  The profile  has the desired  value w, 
because each time an admissible  pair was substituted  for a continuation  value, 
the value was preserved.  Moreover  the action and reward  function after each 
history comprise an admissible  pair by construction,  so no player has a prof- 
itable "one-shot"  deviation.  Backward  induction  then implies  that no deviations 
at a finite number  of information  sets can benefit a player.  Finally,  the fact that 
period t payoffs  are bounded and are discounted  heavily  if t is large, implies 
that cheating infinitely  often is unprofitable  (otherwise, some deviation at a 
finite number  of information  sets would also be profitable). 
PROOF: The proof is constructive.  For all w E B(W) we specify sequential 
equilibria v^(w) such that  v(6f(w))  = w.  For each  w E B(W),  consider the 
function  U(w) E LO(Q,  W)  as defined  earlier. Recursively define  the  functions 
Ut(w):  Qt -+ RN  as follows: U'(w)  =  U(w),  Ut(w)(pt)  =  U(Ut  '(w)xpt-  ')Apt), 
t = 2,3....  Since U(w)(p)  E W a.e. p E Q2,  for each t  1, 2,...  , Ut(w)(pt)  E  W 
a.e. pt E Qt,  so that Ut(w) E Lc(Qt,  W). The required  strategy  profiles  v^(w) are 
a^(w)(1)  =  Q(w), 6^(w)(t  + 1)(pt,  qt) =  Q(Ut(w)(pt)),  t = 1,  2, ....  Observe that 
the 6^(w)'s  are independent  of past actions.  We will write 6^(w)I,t for 6a(W)Ipt,qt. 
Note  also that the  6^(wXt)'s are Lebesgue measurable functions, being the 
composition  of universally  measurable  functions  (see the Appendix). 
It may be checked  that v(6f(w)) = w for all w E B(W).  By construction,  given 
&i(w),  the strategy 6i(w)  is "unimprovable"  (after almost all histories, no 
one-shot deviation  improves  a player's  payoff),  and hence optimal for player i 
(see, for instance,  Whittle  (1983),  Theorem  2.1, Chapter  24, and, for the genesis 
of this idea, Howard  (1960)).  Thus, 6 (w) is a best response to &_(w)  for all i, 
and v^(w)  is a Nash equilibrium. 
It now remains only to  show that v^(w)  is  an S.E. Consider any history 
(pt, qt).  Since players' strategies do not depend  on past actions, and expected 
payoffs  in any period depend only on actions in that period, beliefs about past 
actions are irrelevant,  and we need only check that U^(w)lIt  is a Nash equilib- 
rium for almost all pt E Qt,  t =  1,2....  But a.e. pt e-  t,  (w)Ipt  =  6^(x) for 
some x E W and we have just shown that v1(x) is a Nash equilibrium  for all 
x E B(W) D W.  Q.E.D. 
REMARK:  The assumption  of constant support  (A3) implies that all possible 
price histories occur in equilibrium.  As a consequence, there is no material 
difference  between Nash and sequential  equilibria.  For each Nash equilibrium 
there is a payoff-equivalent  sequential equilibrium  which (modulo events of 
measure zero) differs from the former only after histories corresponding  to a 
player's  own deviations.  Both strategy  profiles  hence generate the same equilib- 
rium  behavior. 
The next result  can be viewed  as a strategic,  set-valued  expression  of Bellman's 
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THEOREM  2 (Factorization):  V=  B(V). 
PROOF: By Theorem 1, it suffices  to establish  that V is a bounded Borel set 
and that V c B(V). We first  show that V is self-generating.  Consider  w E  V and 
an S.E. oa such that v(()  =  w. Let (q, u) be a pair such that q =c(1)  and 
u(p)  = v(o,lp,  (l)) for all p E Q2.  We must prove that (q, u) is admissible  with 
respect to V, and that E(q; u) =  w. Observe that u is Lebesgue measurable, 
since it may be written as the discounted sum of Lebesgue measurable  func- 
tions.5  Clearly, 
w =  4H(.-(i))  + fv(o-IP,  (l))g(p;  -(1))  dp] =E(q;  u). 
By (A3), the information  sets (p, oj(l)) are reached  in equilibrium  for all p E D2. 
Hence player i can use Bayes' rule to predict  what player  i's future behavior 
will be. Since players are using pure strategies, player i's conditional  beliefs 
about player i's behavior are concentrated  at ajlp  ,  ,o(),  which is a strategy  in 
G"(8). Hence  Uip,,(l)  is an S.E. of  G'(5).  In other words, under our assump- 
tions, the repeated  game has a recursive  structure.  It follows  from  the preceding 
discussion  that u(p) E V, for almost all p E Q2. 
For any i and yi E Si, consider (Ji  such that Jij(l)  = yi and  Ip,  y,  =  OiIp,q  for 
all p eQ.  Then (5ai,  01_i)lp,(,y1,q ) =  Oip,q.  Since a- is an S.E., vi((J)  > vi(J;,  a-i), 
which  implies Ei(q; u) > Ei(yi, q-i; u). This establishes  the admissibility  of (q, u). 
Note that V c [8/(1  -  S)]co{HI(q)I  q E S} (co := convex  hull). Since S is finite, 
this implies  that V is bounded.  We defer proving  that V is a Borel set; this will 
be an immediate  corollary  of Theorem  4.  Q.E.D. 
Take the self-generating  set W in the statement  of Theorem 1 to be V. It is 
worth noting that for any w E V, the profile (T(w)  constructed  in the proof of 
Theorem 1 is a sequential  equilibrium  in which no player  conditions  his choice 
of action in any period on actions he has previously  taken. 
In  establishing that  V c B(V),  the  proof of  Theorem 2  constructs pairs 
admissible  with respect  to V that mimic  the first-period  incentive  structure  of an 
S.E. That this is possible depends on the fact that equilibrium  continuation 
values after the first period are elements of  V. This accounts  for some limita- 
tions in the scope of our inquiry.  First, mixed strategies are excluded from 
consideration.  If players randomize  in the first period, player 1 cannot infer 
(from the signal and the equilibrium  hypothesis)  what other players'  continua- 
tion strategies  are:  player  2's continuation  strategy  may  depend  on his first-period 
action,  which  is unobservable  to 1, and is no longer  specified  deterministically  by 
the S.E. The same problem arises in models in which players  observe private 
SThat  is,  u(p)  = El>3  t-'Eta(7(p(0,  q(t)) IP(l)= p),  where  E?'(7r(p(t),q(t))jp(l)  =p)  is  the 
conditional expectation of players' payoffs in period  t, when they follow the strategy profile  r, given 
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signals: because  they are conditioning  their actions on information that is not 
publicly observed,  players cannot  compute  one  another's  continuation  strate- 
gies.  Continuation profiles need  not be  equilibria; the link between  sequential 
equilibria  and  admissibility with  respect  to  V  is  broken.  (By  assuming  that 
player  i's  payoff is  determined  by his  own  action  and  the  publicly observed 
signal, we ensure that payoffs do not serve as privately observed signals.) Finally, 
we  assume  in  Section  2  that  the  support of  the  signal is  independent  of  the 
action profile. Suppose,  instead,  that there  are three  players who,  in the  first 
period of an S.E. o-, are supposed to play the profile q, and that some value p  is 
outside the support of the signal, given q. If player 3 cheats and p arises, player 
1 concludes that either player 2 or player 3 deviated; suppose that his posterior 
gives equal weight to both alternatives. Similarly, suppose player 2 gives equal 
weight  to  the  possibilities  that  1 or 3 deviated.  The  continuation  profile need 
not be an equilibrium; moreover, the continuation value for player 3 might now 
be  worse  than  his  least-preferred  S.E.  value.  Consequently  a pair admissible 
with respect  to  V  is unable  to  match the  severity with which  o- punishes  the 
deviation by player 3. In this case VX B(V). 
4.  BANG-BANG  REWARD  FUNCTIONS  AND  THE  STRUCTURE  OF EQUILIBRIA 
This section proves that any reward function can be replaced by one yielding 
each player the same expected value (without affecting incentive compatibility) 
and taking on values  only in the  set  of  extreme  points  of  V. Apart from the 
obvious practical advantages this offers in working with particular games, it has 
theoretical applications: examples are provided in the proofs of Theorems 5 and 
6 and Lemma 1. 
For  W c  RN,  let  co W denote  the  convex  hull  of  W and  ext W  the  set  of 
extreme points of co W. 
DEFINITION:  U E L (Q; W)  has the  bang-bang property if  u(p)  E ext W a.e. 
p E Q. 
Theorem  3 below implies that the function  U of Section 3 can be chosen  so 
that for each w, U(w) has the bang-bang property. Now consider the nature of 
an equilibrium with value w, and summarized by (Q, U) with U chosen as above. 
For  almost  all  signals  p(l)  arising  in  the  first  period,  an  extremal  reward 
U(w)(p(1))  is  "delivered" by  the  pair (Q(U(w)(p(1))),  U(U(w)(p(1)))).  When 
p(2) is observed, a new reward function comes into effect, and so on. Since after 
any t-period history, players' future payoffs are in ext V, a play of the game can 
be viewed  as an alternation among extreme points of  V, where  the particular 
pattern of extreme points is determined by the sequence of realized outcomes of 
the random signal. For the special case in which V is one-dimensional  (as it is, 
for example, when  attention  is restricted to symmetric equilibria of  symmetric 
games), this means that only two extreme points, and hence two action profiles, 
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THEOREM  3:  Let  WC RN  be compact and  (q, ui) be an  admissible pair  with 
respect to co W. Then there exists a function ii  EuL'(Q;  ext W)  such that (q, -u) is 
admissible with respect to W and E(q; -u)  = E(q; O). 
PROOF:  Let 
F  ={u  eL(f2,  co W)I (q, u)  is admissible w.r.t. co W 
and E(q;  u)  = E(q;  d)} . 
By assumption F  is nonempty (d2  E F),  and it may easily be checked that  F  is 
convex. By Alaoglu's theorem, F  is compact when L'(Q; co W) is endowed with 
the weak-* topology. Hence,  by the Krein-Milman theorem,  F  has an extreme 
point. 
By (Al),  the set of integral constraints defining F  is finite and Proposition 6.2 
of  Aumann  (1965)  applies  directly. It implies  that  any extreme  point  -u of  F 
satisfies  ii(p)e  ext W  a.e.  p.  Since  ext W c  W, (q,  -u)  is  also  admissible  with 
respect to W, and the proof is complete.  Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY:  Let  W c  RN  be compact.  Then B(W)  = B(co  W). 
The  proofs  of  Lemma  1 and  Theorem  4  below  are  analogous  to  those  of 
Proposition 4 and Corollary 2, respectively, of APS.  It is often  useful to know 
that the  operator  B  preserves compactness; for example, this guarantees  that 
when applying the algorithm of Section 5, each element  of the sequence  of sets 
generated  is compact (so that the bang-bang result can be  invoked to simplify 
the calculations at each stage). Similarly, it is critical to much of the analysis to 
follow that the bang-bang result be  applicable to pairs admissible with respect 
to V; this depends on the compactness of  V. 
LEMMA  1: The operator  B is monotone and preserves  compactness: (i) if W c  W' 
CRN  B(W)  CB(W'); (ii) if WCRN  is compact, B(W)  is compact. 
PROOF:  Part (i) follows immediately from the definition of admissibility. 
By the Corollary to Theorem 3, B(W)  = B(co W). For each  q E S, let 
l(q)  {=  {u E L(fQ;  co W)l (q; u)  is admissible w.r.t.  co W}. 
Alaoglu's theorem implies that l(q)  is weak-* compact. Since E(q; u) is continu- 
ous in u, and S is finite, 
B(co  W)  =  U  E({q}  x l(q)) 
qeS 
is compact as a finite union of compact sets.  Q.E.D. 
THEOREM  4:  V is compact. 
PROOF:  Recall  from the  proof  of  Theorem  2  that  V  is bounded  and  self- 
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compact. By monotonicity,  V = B(V)  c B(cl(V)),  and by Lemma 1, B(cl(V))  is 
compact. Hence,  cl(V) c B(cl(V)),  and self-generation  implies cl(V) c  V. Thus, 
V is closed and compact.  Q.E.D. 
Since V is compact, V is a Borel set, as claimed in Theorem 2. 
5.  COMPUTATION 
For many purposes it is important to have an algorithm capable of finding the 
set  V  in  particular supergames.  To  do  so,  it  is  necessary  to  find the  largest 
bounded  fixed  point  of  the  set-valued  map  B.  It  turns  out  that  V  may be 
computed  by  a procedure  analogous  to  Howard's  "value-iteration"  (Howard 
(1960)) for dynamic programs. The algorithm starts with a set W0  c RN such that 
V c B(WO)  c  W0. It then  proceeds  by computing the monotonically  decreasing 
sequence  of  sets  Wn  =B(Wn-1)-  n =  1,2,....  The  limit  of  this  process  is 
V=  limnoW  Nn=lWn- 
The next two lemmas follow directly from factorization and the monotonicity 
of  B;  their  proofs  are  left  to  the  reader.  For  Lemma  2,  recall  that  V c 
[a/(1  -  8)]co H(S)  =  W. Furthermore, if (q, u) is admissible with respect to W, 
E(q; u) =  {IH(q)  + [a/(1  -  8)]x} = [a/(1  -  8)]{(1 -  )II(q)  +  =x}= w for some 
x E co H(S),  which implies w E W. 
LEMMA  2:  Let W:= [8/(1  -8)]co{HI(q)Iq  ES}.  Then VcB(W)  c  W. 
LEMMA  3:  If W C RN  satisfies V c B(W)  c  W, then V c B(B(W))  c B(W). 
LEMMA  4:  Let  {Wn}  be  a  decreasing sequence of  compact sets in RN.  Then 
co n Wn  =  nco  Wn. 
PROOF:  See Appendix. 
THEOREM  5 (Algorithm):  Let W C RN  be compact and satisfy V c B(W)  c  W. 
Define WO  = W and for n = 1, 2,...  let Wn  := B(Wn -1). Then {Wn}  is a decreasing 
sequence and V = limn -Wn. 
PROOF:  By Lemmas 1 and 3, {Wn}  is a decreasing sequence  of compact sets, 
so W.:= limn  ,  Wn  =  n Wn  and W.J'  is compact. Again by Lemma 3, Vc  W_.  To 
complete  the  proof we  need  to  show that  W. c  V. By self-generation  and the 
corollary to Theorem 3, it is sufficient to show that W. c B(co WO).  Consider any 
w EC  W.. By definition, for each n = 1, 2,..  .,  there exists (qn, un) admissible with 
respect  to  Wn such  that  E(qn, Un)  =  w.  Since  qfn  E S,  where  S  is  finite,  and 
L'(f2; Wn)  c L'(f2; co W), where  L'(f2; co W) is a weak-* compact set, we  may 
without  loss  of  generality  assume  qn = q  and u  u  for  some  q E S  and 
u e L'(;  co W).  We  argue  that  (q, u)  is  an  admissible  pair with  respect  to 
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m > n (modulo sets of measure 0), we have u(Q) c co Wn for all n. Hence,  by 
Lemma 4, u(Q) c  n co Wn = co  n  Wn = co W..  Since E(q; *  ): L(Q;  co W)  RN 
is continuous when  L'(Q; co W) is endowed with the weak-* topology, 
E(q, u) =  lim E(q; un)  =  w. 
nf  -  0 
Finally  Ei(q;  ) > E(yi, qi;  Un)  for  each  n =  1,2,...  imply  Ei(q; u)> 
Ei  (yi, q-i; u) for all y1i  E Si and each i = 1,...,  N. Hence (q, u) is admissible 
with respect  to co W., as required.  Q.E.D. 
Fudenberg  and Levine (1983) showed that for a substantial  class of dynamic 
games including  discounted  repeated games, supergame  perfect equilibria  are 
limits  of c-perfect  equilibria  of T-period  truncations  of the supergame,  as c -? 0 
and T -m oo. Although  their result is not presentecf in terms of value iteration, 
our algorithm  is closely related to their limit theorem.  Instead  of increasing  the 
equilibria  of the T-period  game GT(8)  by computing  c-equilibria,  augment  the 
equilibrium  value set by supplementing  period T payoffs  with reward  functions 
drawn from any set  W0 of  the kind specified in Theorem 5.  If  T = 1, for 
example,  the resulting  value set is B(WO).  Hence, for T = 2, the set of supple- 
mented  values  is W2  = B(B(Wo)),  and for arbitrary  T one has the supplemented 
value set  WT. Thus, as T -X oo, this procedure approximates the value set  V of 
G'(8), since limnT -WT  = V. 
6. COMPARATIVE  STATICS:  MONOTONICITY  IN 8 
Intuition suggests that the equilibrium set should in some sense increase with 
the discount  factor.  Plausibly  "cooperation"  becomes easier as players  become 
more patient and thereby  increasingly  willing to forego immediate  gains for a 
possible future reward. One is  led  to  conjecture a  monotonic relationship 
between equilibrium  outcomes  and the number  8, where outcomes  are thought 
of as average  discounted  payoffs.  Despite the complexity  and generality  of the 
model, this conjecture  can be proved  correct  without  invoking  any assumptions 
beyond  those of Theorem  3. When the discount  factor increases  from 81 to 82, 
and payoffs  are appropriately  normalized,  the original  set of equilibrium  values 
is contained  in the new set of values associated  with 82. The proof is short and 
simple and illustrates  the power of self-generation  as an analytical  tool. 
We now write V(a), B(WI  8), and E(q; u I8)  to make explicit  the dependence 
on the particular  value of the discount  factor. 
THEOREM  6 (Monotonicity  in Discount  Factor): Let 81 and 82 be two  discount 
factors  such that 0 <  81  < 82  <  1. Then  [(1 -  81)/811]V(81)  C [(1 -  82)/821V(82) 
PROOF: As may be easily checked, we need to show (1 + k)V(81)c  K32), 
where k:= (82 -  81)/(81(1  -  82)). For any w E V(81)  let (q, u) be an admissible 
pair  with respect to V(81) such that w = E(q; u I81).  Define the function u  + on 
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pair with respect to {kw} + V(81), and E(q; u+ 182)  =  (1  +  k)w. Hence,  (1 + k)w 
E B({kw} + V(81)1  82)  for  all  w E V(81).  Let  A := 1/(1  + k); clearly  A E (0, 1). 
Since  for  any  z E RN, z + kw = A(1 + k)z + (I-A)(1  +  k)w,  we  have  {kw} + 
VKa  ) c co(1 +  k)VO 1). Therefore, (1 + k)V(G1) cB(co(1  + k)VG31)152).  Finally, 
by the corollary of Theorem 3 and self-generation, (1 + k)V(51) c  VG32). Q.E.D. 
7.  OPTIMIZATION  AND  THE  NECESSITY  OF BANG-BANG  REWARD  FUNCTIONS 
This section explores the idea that efficient incentive schemes must necessar- 
ily  have  a  bang-bang  structure.  Consider  WCRN  compact  and  some  qe  S 
which is the first element  of  an admissible pair yielding an extremal payoff in 
the set B(W).  An implication of Theorem 3 is that among the reward functions 
which support q and maximize a linear function of player payoffs, at least one 
has  the  bang-bang property. We  show here  that  under  certain conditions  all 
optimal solutions must be bang-bang. The proof takes a dual approach to the 
optimization  problem  which  highlights  the  way  in  which  considerations  of 
efficiency lead  to  the  use  of  rewards that  are extreme  points  of  V (or, more 
generally, of the compact set  W from which rewards are to be drawn). 
Establishing the necessity of bang-bang solutions requires several conditions 
not  needed  for  the  sufficiency  result.  Precise  statements  of  the  conditions 
involve the following definitions.  The four conditions invoked in the statement 
of Theorem 7 are discussed immediately following the proof. 
For any W  C RN, let  1(W) denote the set of all player indices i for which the 
projection of  W onto the ith coordinate space is not a singleton. That is, 
J( W)  := {  i I  wi # w/ for some w, w' E  W}. 
A pair (q, u) is admissible w.r.t. W only if for each i 0 1(W), HIi(q) > HIi(y,  q_i) 
for all yy  E Si, since Ei(q; u) -  Ei(y, q-i;  u) = Hi(q)  -  H1i(y,  qi) for all yy  E Si. 
DEFINITION:  q E S  satisfies the  Slater constraint qualification with respect  to 
W if there exists u such that (q, u) is admissible w.r.t. co W and 
Ei(q;  u) > Ei(y,  q_i; u)  for all yE  Si \{q  }  and i eJ(W). 
Let  AcRN.  Denote  "(a,,x-y>=0  for  all  x,yeA"  by  a  lA,  and  "not 
a  iA"  by a  LA. We refer to  a  IA  as "a  is perpendicular to A." 
DEFINITION:  For  all  l3 E R N, /3  0,  and  W c  RN  compact,  let  F(/3,  W):= 
argmin{<,l3,  w> Iw E W}  and  F(W)  := {F(/3, W)I/E3  ERN,  ,3 # 0  and  F(/3, W) ? 
ext W}. 
If  W were convex, F(/3, W) would be a face of  W; F(W)  is comprised of all 
those  "pseudo-faces"  of  W that contain nonextreme points of  W. Notice  that 
every pseudo-face  is a subset of the boundary of  W. 
A  rough  intuitive  explanation  of  Theorem  7  is  as  follows.  Variations  in 
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implicitly agreed upon actions. Some regions of the signal space f2 are particu- 
larly useful for the provision of these incentives. In a Green-Porter model, very 
low prices might be much less likely to occur if all players conform than if one 
deviates;  this  favorable  likelihood  ratio  identifies  a  good  region  in  which  to 
"throw away surplus." In a less symmetric model, some subset of Q might have 
higher probability if player 1 were  to  cheat  than if 2 deviated. Here,  perhaps 
one  should transfer surplus from 1 to 2. Moreover, because  of the linearity of 
the relevant optimization problems, there are no "decreasing returns" in using 
such areas intensively (making large transfers, or large movements in a particu- 
lar direction). Only the size of the continuation value set W limits the intensity 
of the exploitation of very informative regions of  Q. Optimization consequently 
tends to push the continuation rewards to the extreme points of  W. One of the 
cases in which it need not do so is discussed before the statement of Lemma 5. 
THEOREM  7:  Let W c RN  be compact, and consider 
(q,  i)  E argmin{ (ca,  E(q;  u) >  I  (q,  u)  is admissible w.r.t.  W) 
for some  aE  c  RN,  a  #  0. Suppose that (i)  g(p;  q) is analytic in p,  (ii)  q-  satisfies 
the Slater constraint qualification with respect to  W, (iii)  F(W)  is  a  countable 
collection of sets,6 and (iv)  a  L  Ffor  all FcE F(W).  Then u satisfies the bang-bang 
property. 
PROOF:  Let  a, q,  and ui be as above. Then,  u  is a solution to: 
(P1)  min(a,  u(p)g(p;  i)dP)  subject to uEc L(f2;  co W), 
Ei(y,  -i;u)  <Ei(iy;u)  for each yeS  iand iEJ(W), 
where we  have used Theorem  3 to replace  W  by co W. The  remark following 
the definition of  1(W)  makes it clear that we may ignore incentive constraints 
for i  - 1(W). We show that any solution to (P1) that has range W must have the 
bang-bang property. The Lagrangean associated with (P1) is 
+o00  if u  - L(Q;  co W), 
J  (u(p),  ((p,  A)  >  dp + b(A)  if u E L(f2;  co W) 
L(u,A)=  Q  andA>0, 
-  oo  if u EL(2;  co W) 
and A  -0, 
6 Not all sets have this property. Consider a cylinder in R3. There are an uncountable number of 
one-dimensional  faces parallel to the axis of the cylinder. However, every convex set in  R2 has at 
most  a  countable  number  of  faces  of  positive  dimension.  Otherwise,  either  its  upper  or  lower 
boundary would  include uncountably many faces.  Projecting these  onto  the  horizontal axis would 
give an uncountable number of disjoint, nondegenerate  intervals, a contradiction. 1056  DILIP  ABREU,  DAVID  PEARCE,  AND  ENNIO  STACCHETTI 
where A is the vector of Lagrange multipliers {A  ia I  y E Si,  i E J(W)}, 
{i(p,A)  (aic-  E Ai,)g(p;4)  +  E  Ai,g(p;y,4-i) 
yesi  yes, 
and 
b(A)  =  E  EAiy[ii(Y,  -i) - ii(q)] 
iel(W)  yeSi 
Note  for later use that the index function  ji(p, A) is analytic in p,  and 
|f(p,A)  dp=a. 
Also,  by (ii), optimal Lagrange multipliers A > 0 exist (see  Rockafellar (1974)) 
and any solution to (P1) also solves 
(P2)  min L(u, A)  subject to u E L(2;  co W). 
It is clear that any optimal solution  u of (P2) which has range W must be such 
that  u(p)  E arg  min{(  (p, A),  w >  I  w E  W} = F(  (p,  A), W)  a.e.  p  E Q2.  That  is, 
a.e. p, u(p)  lies in a "pseudo-face" of  W and to complete the proof it suffices to 
show that there does not exist a subset of signals of positive measure for which 
u(p)  lies in pseudo faces which are not composed  entirely of extreme points of 
W.  Suppose  there  does  exist  QD  cQ  such  that  .u(f2I) > 0  (,u  denotes  the 
Lebesgue  measure)  and  F(f(p,  A), W) e F(W)  for all  p eQ  f2.  By assumption 
(iii),  F(W)  is a countable  collection.  Hence,  there  exist  no cQ  fI  and  E  eRN 
such  that  .u(fo)  > 0  and  F(f(p,  A), W) = F(77, W) E F(W)  for  all  p  E Do, 
By  assumption,  (f(p,  A), x -y  > = 0  for  all  p  E f20  and  any  x, y E F(-q, W). 
Since  (  (p, A), x-y>  is  analytic  in  p  and  jL(fo)  > 0, (f(p,  A),  x-y>=  O 
for all pef2.  Therefore,  for each  x,yeF(-q,W),  0=  Jf((p,A),x-y>dp= 
( J  e(p,  A)  dp, x -  y> = (a,  x -  y>,  where  the  last  equality  was  established 
above. Hence,  a  I F(-q, W), contradicting (iv).  Q.E.D. 
Condition (i) of Theorem 7 is a technical assumption that facilitates the dual 
line of proof we pursue. It is used to guarantee that the function (  (p,  A), x -y> 
appearing near the  end of the proof is analytic. This immediately implies that 
the  function  either has isolated  zeroes,  or is zero  everywhere. Conditions (ii), 
(iii), and (iv) are stated in terms of restrictions on endogenous entities. Although 
ideally  one  would  like  to  make  assumptions on  primitives (see  the  Corollary 
following  Lemma 6), we  think the  theorem  is broadly applicable because  the 
conditions will arguably "often" be satisfied. When the set W is taken to be the 
equilibrium value set  V, the  Slater constraint qualification (condition  (ii)) and 
condition (iv) hold generically in senses made precise by Lemmas 5 and 6. We 
do not have an analogous result for condition (iii), but as footnote  5 explains, 
(iii) is satisfied in all  two-person games, or for any value set that is of no more DISCOUNTED  REPEATED  GAMES  1057 
than two dimensions.  We remark  that Theorem  7 does not apply  to games  with 
finite signal spaces. 
Condition (iv) serves to  exclude exceptional cases such as the following. 
Suppose that for signals  in some set DO  of positive  measure,  a reward  function 
u supporting  q optimally  with respect  to a takes on values  in some face F of W. 
(For simplicity,  the reader  might  think of the extreme  case where W consists  of 
a single face.) Consider another function u' supporting  q, which on f2D also 
takes on values in F, and coincides with u elsewhere. Such a u' will typically 
exist, as there will be  many ways to  satisfy the incentive constraints.  If  a 
happens to be perpendicular  to  F, u' yields the same value of the objective 
function  as does u, and hence is a distinct  solution  to the optimization  problem. 
Any nondegenerate convex combination u  of  u  and u' is  also an optimal 
solution.  Of course, u fails to have the bang-bang  property. 
To understand  the precise sense in which  the Slater  constraint  qualification  is 
satisfied  generically,  consider  the following  notation.  For each q E S, let 8(q):= 
inf{8 q  is supportable  by  V(8)} (if  q  cannot be supported by V(8) for any 
a  Ec(0, 1), let  8(q):= 1). The  independence condition used in  Lemma 5  is 
analogous  to those introduced  by Fudenberg,  Levine, and Maskin  (1988). 
LEMMA  5:  Let q E S. Assume that the collection {g( ; q)} U {g( ; y, q-  )Iy E 
Si\  {qJ},  i = 1, . .  .,  N}  is linearly independent. Then q satisfies the Slater constraint 
qualification with respect to V(a) for any 8 E (8(q), 1). 
PROOF:  See the Appendix. 
Condition  (iv) is unrestrictive  in the following  sense: the set of directions  for 
which it is violated has measure  0 in RN. 
LEMMA  6:  Let  WcR N  be compact, and assume F(W)  is a countable collec- 
tion. Then the set A  {,13  E RNI 3 1  F for some F E F(W))  is of first category  and 
has measure 0. 
PROOF:  See the Appendix. 
Suppose that players are cooperating as efficiently as possible, given the 
incentive  constraints  they face. Then for some welfare  weights  a  E RN, they are 
playing  an S.E. o  that minimizes (a, v(y)> over all S.E.'s y. Correspondingly, 
the pair (q, u), where q =  o(1)  and u(p) =  v(alp) for all p e U,  solves the 
minimization  problem  appearing  in the statement  of Theorem 7 (with V= W). 
Lemma  6 indicates  that, assuming  that V satisfies  (iii), a will generically  satisfy 
(iv) of Theorem 7; then by Theorem 7, v(orlp)  is an extreme point of  V for 
almost all p E Q. In order to extend this result on the necessity of bang-bang 
continuation  reward  functions  beyond the first period, one needs to know that 
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be supported by some welfare weights  /E  E RN  satisfying (iv), relative to V. But 
for almost all p, {(p,  A) is such a vector of weights (see  the proof of Theorem 
7). Thus, with probability 1 the continuation values of or at the end of periods 1 
and 2 (and, by induction, any period t) must be extreme points of  V. 
One sees in the proof of Theorem 7 that the reward function that supports a 
given  q E S  optimally for some welfare weights  is essentially unique.  Another 
implication of the necessity  result is that in the  analysis of strongly symmetric 
equilibria of symmetric repeated  games, the maximum of the value set will be 
strictly lowered if punishment severity is reduced. In a finite action Green-Porter 
model, for example, losses will result from restricting attention to punishments 
no  worse  than  "Cournot-Nash  reversion." Even  if  this  restriction  is  imposed 
(perhaps for considerations of simplicity), it is best to use punishments involving 
permanent  reversion,  rather  than  temporary  reversion  followed  by  resumed 
cooperation (take the set  W in Theorem 7 to be the correspondingly restricted 
equilibrium value set). If in a particular example one  requires the criterion for 
punishment to  be  a "tail test" when  this is in fact inappropriate, a moderate 
punishment value may be  constrained  optimal; this  explains the  interior solu- 
tions for reversion time reported for certain cases in Porter (1983). Notice  that 
in  models  having  value  sets  of  higher  dimension,  payoffs  can  be  extremal 
without being in any sense  severe. 
Finally, observe that an immediate implication of Theorem 7, footnote  5, and 
Lemmas 5 and 6 is the following result expressed in terms of primitives. 
COROLLARY:  In a two player game, let q E S and suppose 8 0 8(q),  g(;  q)  is 
analytic, and that {g(;  q)} U {gQ-;  y, q_j)Iy  E Si\{qi},  i =  1, 2} is linearly  indepen- 
dent. Then for almost all  aE  ERN,  if u E argmin{(a,  E(q, u)> I(q, u) is admissible 
w.r.t. V(6)}, then u has the bang-bang  property. 
8.  CONCLUSION 
Our purpose  in  this paper  has been  to  contribute  to  the  foundations  of  a 
systematic theory of repeated discounted games with imperfect monitoring. The 
results  suggest  that  ultimately  a  fairly  tractable  and  satisfying  theory  will 
emerge.  Already  available  for  a  broad  class  of  these  games  are  powerful 
characterizations of the equilibrium value set, a variety of results on the nature 
of implicit reward functions generated by extremal equilibria, and comparative 
static  and  computational  theorems.  In  addition,  the  limiting  case  as  a  ap- 
proaches  1  is  particularly well  understood  as  a  result  of  the  folk  theorem 
literature mentioned  in the Introduction. While some of our theorems, notably 
the bang-bang principle, specifically address the problems caused by imperfect 
monitoring, those  in Section 3 (and, with appropriate qualifications, Sections 5 
and 6) apply also to games with perfect monitoring. Not yet covered are hybrid 
cases  falling  between  models  with  perfect  monitoring  and  those  having  a 
publicly observed random signal with constant support. Also  awaiting study are DISCOUNTED  REPEATED  GAMES  1059 
mixed  strategy equilibria of  repeated  discounted  games.  These  problems  de- 
serve much attention. 
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APPENDIX 
Measurability  of the Strategies  5" 
Lemma C below states that the functions Q and U can be chosen to satisfy certain measurability 
properties.  These  imply  that  the  strategies  5", constructed  in  the  proof  of  the  self-generation 
theorem,  are  indeed  measurable  functions.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  Lebesgue 
measurability of Q and U, because 5"  is comprised of compositions of these functions, and Lebesgue 
measurability is not  preserved under composition.  We work instead with universal measurability, 
which has the required composition property. 
Let  q  denote the Borel o-algebra of  RK,  and for each Borel probability measure A, let  q(A)  be 
the  completion  of  q  with  respect  to  A.  q(A)  is  a  o-algebra  which  contains  q.  The  universal 
o-algebra i  is  n  (,u),  where the  intersection  is over all Borel probability measures on  RK.  We 
remark that  q  is  contained  in  @<, which  in  turn  is  contained  in  the  o-algebra  of  Lebesgue 
measurable sets. 
Function f:  RK-3  RL  is universally  measurable if for every Borel set Y c RL,  f  1(y)  E  l<.  Every 
universally measurable function is Lebesgue measurable. The reader may find it helpful to consult 
the excellent treatment of this material in Bertsekas and Shreve (1978). 
Define  h:  2 -32  R by h(p)  = maxq E s g(p; q) for each  p E 12, and for any Lebesgue measurable 
function  u:  2 -l2 RN, let 
HUIIIh  f 1Iu(p)j1h(p)  dp. 
We  denote  by L1(f2; RN; h) (L1 for short) the  set  of  equivalence  classes  of  Lebesgue  measurable 
functions  u: l2 -3 RN  such that  IIuIIh  <  + oo,  and endow it with the norm topology induced by I  I  Ih- 
L1 is a separable Banach  space,  and for any bounded  set  WcRN  LE(f2;  W)  can be viewed  as a 
subset of  L1. 
For each  u E L1, p Ec12,  and n E N, let 
a 
R(p,  n):=  2 n  X  [Pk  -  1/n,  Pk +  1/n]  (recall n2  c Ra), 
k=1 
Un( p)  =  (2n  )a  u(t) dt, 
R(p, n) 
and u*(p):=  lim u'(p)  if the limit exists, and u*(p)  = 0 otherwise. If  v(E)  = IQ E U(P) dp, u* is 
almost everywhere the derivative of  v with respect to the Lebesgue  measure and coincides with u 
almost everywhere. 
For a given bounded Borel measurable set  WC  RN  and for any q E S, let 
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and for each p E n  and w E  Wq,  let 
2q(P,  w)  {u*(p)l  (q,  u)  is admissible w.r.t.  W and E(q;  u)  = 
Lemmas A and B below prove that Wq and graph(4  ) are analytic sets. The set of continuous real 
functions on  RN,  vanishing at infinity, is denoted by C7O(RN). In the proof of Lemma A we use the 
following result: the  smallest class of  real functions on  RN  containing  CO(RN)  and closed  under 
bounded pointwise limits7 is the class of bounded Borel functions. 
LEMMA A:  For  any  Borel  set  W5RN  F:=  {u eLlIu(p)  E W  a.e.  p e1f}  is  a  Borel  set  of 
L1PM;  RN; h). 
PROOF:  The  function  z -< (z,  h)  =  z(p)h(p)  dp  from  Ll(f2; R; h)  into  R  is  continuous. 
Below  we  show  that  for  each  bounded  Borel  function  f:  RN  -3 R,  the  function  u -tf o  u  from 
L1(';  RN; h)  into  L1(';  R; h)  is Borel  measurable. Therefore,  the  function  6:  L1(f;  RN; h) -3  R 
defined by 0(u):=  (f  o u, h)  is Borel measurable for any bounded Borel function f.  In particular, let 
f=  lw; then 
F=0-1  f  h(p)dp 
and F  is a Borel set as the preimage of a closed set. 
Clearly, if f E CO(RN),  the function  u  f o u from  L1C(2;  RN; h) into  L1(f2; R; h) is continuous 
(and hence Borel measurable). Suppose that {ffn  is a sequence of bounded Borel functions such that 
u -3fn  o u is Borel measurable, supn ,Ifn(x)I  < +0,  and f(x)  =  limn fn(x)  exists for each  x.  Then 
f o  u = lim,(fn o  u),  and  u -)f  o u  is  Borel  as the  limit of  Borel  measurable functions.  Therefore, 
u  f o u is Borel measurable for any bounded Borel function f.  Q.E.D. 
LEMMA  B:  For any bounded Borel set WcRN,  and for any q e  S, Wq  is an analytic set in R  and 
graph(@q)  is an analytic set in n  x RN x RN. 
PROOF: Let 
G  ={(p,  w, w, u)  E n  x RN x RN x L' I  (q, u)  is admissible w.r.t.  W, wP  = E(q;  u), 
and w = u*(p)}. 
We will show that G is a Borel set. Since W  and graph(Oq) are the projections of  G into RN and 
n  x RN  x RN, respectively, they are analytic sets. 
To show that G is a Borel set, we note that G = G1 nl G2 nl G3, where 
Gl:=  {(p,  w',  w, u)lw' = E(q;  u)  and for each i and yi E  Si, wi' > Ei(yi,  q-i;  u)}, 
G2:=  {(p,  W,w,  u)ju(p)  E W almost everywhere p  E Q}, 
G3  =  {(p,  w, w, u)1 w =u*(p)} 
Since for each y E S, E(,y;  ): L'  RN  is continuous, G1 is a closed set. Lemma A implies that G2 
is a Borel set. Finally, let  G4  = {(p, w, w, u) I  lim un(p)  exists}. Then 
[(p, w, w, u) E G3  G4] iff [Vmr  eN  3r E N Vn > r, Iw-uUn(p)l  <  1/m]. 
Since  the  set  of  (p, w',  w, u)  satisfying  Iw -  un(p)l  <1/M  is open, G3 n G4 is a Borel set, being 
formed by countable unions and intersections of Borel sets. Also,  (p,  w, w, u)  E  G4 if  {un(p)}  is a 
Cauchy sequence,  and a similar argument shows that G4 (and consequently  G4) is Borel; therefore, 
G3 is a Borel  set.  Q.E.D. 
Since graph(Pq) is  an analytic set, the von Neumann selection,  theorem implies that the 
multifunction  4Pq  admits  a universally  measurable  selection O)q:  Q2  X Wq  -* RN  (see Bertsekas  and 
7By  this we  mean  that  if  {fn}  is a sequence in the class such  that  supn,  Ifn(x)I  <  +oo  and 
f(x) = lim fn(x)  exists  for each x, then f  is also in the class. DISCOUNTED  REPEATED  GAMES  1061 
Shreve (1978)). Suppose  S = {q(1),..  ., q(r)},  and let  Wq(l)  = Wq(1)  and 
k-1 
Wq(k)  = Wq(k)\ U  Wq(l),  k = 2,.  r. 
1=1 
Each  Wq is a universally measurable set  and {Wq}  is a partition of  E(W). Fix  q* ES.  Define  Q: 
RN  *S  and 4: QXRN  *RN  by 
f  q  for each w'  E Wq  and q E S, 
Q(  ):=  q*  for each w'B(W), 
Oq(P,w)  foreachpef2,4E'eWqandqES, 
(  )  \  0  for each p E Q, if w'  e B(W). 
Finally, for each  p E Q  and w E RN  let  U(w'Xp):=  4(p,  w'); for evely  w'  E RN, U(w') ELl.  These 
observations are summarized in the next Lemma. 
LEMMA C:  For any bounded Borel set  W c RN,  B(W)  is a bounded universally measurable set of 
RN,  and  there exists a  pair  of  functions  Q:  RN  * S  and  U:  RN  -* L'  such  that  (i)  for  each 
w E B(w), (Q(W'),  U(W'))  is admissible w.r.t.  W and E(Q(W');  UW')) = W';  and (ii) the functions Q and 
X, where 4:  Q x RN  -  RN  is defined by 0(p,  w') = U(wX p),  are universally  measurable. 
The  composition  of  universally measurable  functions  is universally measurable. Therefore,  for 
example,  for  each  w' Ee g(W),  the  function  6(w')(3)(p1,  P2)  =  Q(U(U( w)(p1))(p2))  = 
Q(K(P2, 4O(Pl, W')))  is universally measurable in (P1, P2).  Similarly, each 6(W'Xt),  t > 2, is universally 
measurable and (a fortiori) Lebesgue measurable. Consequently, each v(w)  defined in the proof of 
self-generation is indeed  a strategy profile. 
Proof of Lemma 4 
LEMMA  4:  Let {Wn}  be a decreasing  sequence of compact sets in RN. Then co n  Wn =  n co Wn. 
PROOF: Clearly nl W c  nl co W,  and since  nl co Wn is convex, co nl WJ  c  nl co WJ.  Conversely, we 
argue that co n W_Dnco  Wn.  Let x E n co Wn.  By Caratheodory's Theorem, for each  n there exist 
An  E RN+ 1 and (wjz.  .  ) E  WN+  such that An  >0,  Eij  An =  1, and  x = EiN,j  Aqw[n. Since 
{An} is  bounded,  {(w  .,wN+  d)} cW1N+,  and  W1 is  compact,  we  can  assume  without  loss  of 
generality  that  An -* A and (Wnz.  W+1)  .  (W..  WN+ 1),  where  A > 0  and EiN+1 Ai = 1. Since 
(Wm,...Wj+1)  E=  WN+l  for  each  m > n,  and  Wn is  compact,  (w1,.  wN+ i)  E WN+l  for  all  n. 
Thus (w1,...,  wN+ 1) E [  n W]N+  and by continuity  E=  1 A,wi =x.  Therefore xE  con  JWn.  Q.E.D. 
Genericity  Results  for Section 7 
We show that under the following assumption on the density functions g, each q E S satisfies the 
Slater constraint qualification with respect to V(a) for all a > 3(q). 
(LI) The collection {g(;  q)} U {g(;  y, q_-)Ily  E  Si \{qi},  i = 1..,  N}  is linearly independent.8 
For each  q E S, a  E (0, 1), and partition {Ik}/=  1  of  12, let  S,* = Si \  {qi}, and 
gk  =  g(p;  q) dp,  k =1.  K; 
gzk  f g(p;  y, q)  dp,  k=  1.  K;-,y  eS?';i  eJ(V(6));  y 
k 
k=  k =1.  K; y  E S?'; i E J(V(8)). 
8 This assumption will not be satisfied in a symmetric model  at a symmetric q c  S. The  results 
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Then define  the matrices  A':=  [a',k]Y,yk for i cJ(V(A)),  and 
-Al 
A:=  where  J(V(8))  = {i....  j}. 
LEMMA D:  For each  q e S  and  8 e (0, 1),  there exists a partition {Ik}kL 1 of  n  such  that Ik  is 
measurable  for each k =  1.  K,  and the corresponding  matrix  A (as  defined above) is full  (column) 
rank. 
This technical  result  follows  directly  from  (LI), and we omit its proof. 
LEMMA 5:  Each  q e S  satisfies the  Slater constraint qualification with respect to  V(a)  for  any 
8 E (a(q), 1). 
PROOF: Let q e S be such that 8(q) <  1, and let 8 e  (8(q),  1). Choose e?, ell  ...  d  e  V(8) such 
that min, el 0 max, el  for all i cJ(V(A)),  and define xl :=el  -  eo,  =  1.  d. Let 8' e  (a(q), 8).  By 
Theorem  6 (Monotonicity),  q is supportable  by V(W'),  and 
G(1  -8)  V(8')  C co V(a). 
8'(1 -8) 
Let Z be the subspace  spanned  by {x%}=  1 and let Bz denote the unit ball in Z. It follows  that there 
exist t e RN  and E > 0 such that 
(*)  {t) + V(8')  + EBz 5 co V(a). 
Let {Ik}kLl  and {A'}i  jJ(v(r))  be as defined in Lemma D. Suppose that J(V(8)){ =(.j},  and 
consider  the system  of linear  equations 
[  xIA'  x7A'  ...  fA'  A'l  [i 
'XAJ  x}2Ai  ...  X dA}  j  kd1 
with unknowns  Al  e RK, 1  1, . . ., d. Since  by construction,  for each i e J(V(8))  there is 1 such that 
x#  0, the previous  lemma implies that the matrix  above is full rank, and so the system has a 
solution A. Let u' be such that (q, u') is admissible  with respect  to V(W').  Define 
d 
u(p):=t+u'(p)+r  -E  kx  when  pEIk,kl.  K. 
1=1 
By (*), for small enough q > 0, u(p) e co V(a) for all p e Q2.  Furthermore,  since for each y E Si* 
and i cJ(V()), 
Ei(q;  u 18) -  E(y,  qq-i; U  1)  =  [E(q;  u'1')  -  Ei(y,  q-i;  u'18')] 
K  d 
+  a 
' 
,k  EAk  Xi' 
k =1  1=1 
>8 7  >0, 
and for each y e S,* and i e J(V(A)), 
Ei(q;  u  8) -Ei(y,  q -i;u)  =  a [Ei(q;  u'13')  -  Ei(y,  q  j; u'l  8)]  > 0, 
we are done.  Q.E.D. 
LEMMA  6: Let W  c RN be compact,  and assume  F(W) is a countable  collection.  Then the set 
A  = {,l3  E RN ,l3  1 F for some  F E F(W)} is of first  category  and has measure  0. DISCOUNTED  REPEATED  GAMES  1063 
PROOF: For each F e F(W), define F1  {f e RN 1/3  1 F}. Since F'  is a subspace  of RN of 
dimension  at most N -  1,  F '  is nowhere  dense and has measure  0. Since F(W) is countable,  it 
follows  that A  = U F E F(w)F 1  is of first  category  and has measure  0.  Q.E.D. 
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